The United States has pledged to withdraw all its armed forces – as well as allies, partners and civil security personnel – within 14 months of the signing of the agreement, until the Taliban proves its commitment to the agreement. Probably in good faith, the United States also committed to move its troops to 8,600 and withdraw them from 5 military bases within the first 135 days. As part of the power-sharing agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah in May 2020, Abdullah was appointed president of the High Council for National Reconciliation, a group that will have the final say on whether to sign a negotiated agreement with the Taliban. In June 2020, the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan confirmed that they would meet in Doha for the first round of talks; However, the Afghan government was cautious in organizing the next meeting and stressed that no agreement or consensus had been reached on a direct negotiating ground. In late July, the Afghan government and the Taliban concluded a three-day ceasefire in accordance with Eid al-Adha, and representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban finally held a formal launch ceremony for peace talks in Doha in September 2020. Without a clear winner in Kabul, there is no apparent party with which the Taliban can negotiate. Therefore, intra-Afghan negotiations, crucial for the next step towards the peace force in Afghanistan, cannot take place. Second, issues relating to the composition of a future Afghan state must be resolved so that negotiations can be considered a success. The Afghan government and the Taliban will have to address fundamental ideological concerns, as well as deep and practical concerns about power-sharing, transitional justice and disarmament, the demobilization and reintegration of the Taliban into the Afghan security forces. The Taliban`s stated goal for Afghanistan was to restore the overthrown Islamic Emirate in 2001. If the Taliban take their participation in these negotiations seriously and enter into a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government, they must be flexible and willing to compromise, including for others. In February 2019, a new round of talks took place in Qatar, this time with Baradar in the Taliban delegation[79] – he had been released by Pakistan in October 2018 at the request of the United States. [80] [81] Khalilzad stated that this round of negotiations was « more productive than in the past » and that a draft peace agreement had been concluded.

The agreement included the withdrawal of U.S. and international troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban, which did not allow other jihadist groups to operate inside the country. [79] The Taliban also announced progress in the negotiations. [79] Like the agreement between the United States and the Taliban, the United States agreed to reduce its troops to 8,600 within the first 135 days after the agreement was signed and to withdraw all its troops within 14 months until the Taliban complied with their agreement with the United States. The United States also agreed to continue to seek funds for the training, equipment and advice of the Afghan security forces. In addition to the formal agreement signed [PDF] between the United States and the Taliban, the New York Times and others reported that the agreement also contained classified annexes. In February 2020, members of Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper expressing concerns about these annexes, particularly proposals that the United States would begin sharing information with the Taliban. Us.